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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Charles Sanders Santiago Peirce, an original American thinker in 
mathematics, physics, ethics, metaphysics, cosmology, religion and his-
tory, has often been ridiculed for awkward phrasing, abstruse vocabu-
lary, and bewildering repetition. Peirce, however, argued that each 
word which he chose was the product of deliberate selection. His 
choice, he would have argued, underscored a methodical principle, a 
plan concerned more with a systematic than a metaphysical approach. 
"Habit" is one of Peirce's prime concepts; it is a term of de-
liberate selection and a concept of which modern educators should be 
aware. 
. The general goal of this thesis is to offer the proper apologia 
for Peircean habit, an apologia which clearly defines the nature of 
habit within Peirce's mature works and which formulates a proposition 
on the value of habit for both those educators who have considered the 
role of habit in education and those who have not. 
Having briefly sketched Peirce's life and having reviewed the 
literature on Peircean habit, I will clear the ground for an explica-
tion of "habit." "Ground clearing" will define common terms and con-
cepts which Peirce charged with new meanings (meanings which manifestly 
1 
departed from ordinary usage) and will define the peculiarly Peircean 
vocabulary which bears upon the understanding of the single concept, 
habit. 
2 
Since Peirce "failed" (chose not) to develop "habit" completely 
in any one article or volume, I will consider all his collected pub-
lished papers and concentrate on his more mature, thus more developed, 
works. I will restate the sense of the quoted text for clearness, and 
then make appropriate explanations, expansions, and internal criticisms. 
I will note sundry Peircean modifications, shortcomings, and charac-
teristic features. 
At conclusion, I will highlight the emphatic value and merit of 
Peircean habit for modern education. Within the conclusion, I will 
comment briefly on the works of any education scholars who have 
written extensively on Peirce's value to education. 
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THE LIFE OF PEIRCE 
The founder of Pragmaticism, Charles Sanders Peirce, was the 
second son of mathematician Benjamin Peirce. Born on September 10, 
1839, Charles was a student of both mathematics and physical science. 
Although he graduated from Harvard at age 20, he hardly distinguished 
-himself as a scholar. 
By encouragement and education, Peirce was a scientist. By 
desire, he was a philosopher. Yet necessity dictated that Peirce work 
for the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey which his father super-
vised. He simultaneously furthered his scientific studies at both 
Lawrence Scientific School and Harvard. By the age of 24, he added an 
M.A. degree and an Sc.B summa cum laude to his credits. 
During his 30 years with the Survey, Charles published minor 
articles on philosophy and logic and was appointed lecturer at Johns 
Hopkins. He remained at Johns Hopkins from 1879 to 1884. His longer 
and seemingly more labored works on logic vainly sought the light of 
publication. Photometric Research is Peirce's sole book published 
during his lifetime. 
Although he had not the benefit of publication, Peirce did have 
the benefit of illustrious friends of no mean influence. Benefactor 
and fellow philosopher William James, philosopher Chaucey Wright, and 
jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes contributed considerably and actively to 
the dialogue on pragmatism or "pragmaticism," Peirce's philosophical 
creation. 
With a small inheritance, Charles S. Peirce retired to Milford, 
Pennsylvania in 1887. He died in undeserved obscurity in 1914. 
He was survived by his second wife, Juliette Froissy. 
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LITERATURE ON PEIRCEAN HABIT 
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear," a paper originally written in 
French, is considered by biographer philosopher Paul Weiss to be 
Charles Peirce's first definite statement of the pragmatic principle. 
Ironically, it is in this statement as in so many others that Peirce 
argued f~r the precision of his language. It is, however, Peirce's 
very precision which, retrospectively, forbids appeal. Charles S. 
Peirce, a teacher without students, a philosopher flashing brilliant 
amid obscure darkness, failed to realize that all too often he came 
close to being lucid but not close enough. He is a man of genius 
who left a wealth of coded brilliance, a brilliance which many have 
succeeded partially in decoding. 
He died on April 19, 1914 leaving hundreds of unindexed, undated, 
unpagiRated manuscripts which Harvard University purchased from 
Juliette Froissy Peirce. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, in six 
volumes, coedited the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce from 
1931 to 1935. Bibliographer Arthur W. Burks, in 1958, edited the 
seventh and eighth volumes. There are also a number of available 
paper back collections on Peirce, The Transactions of The Charles S. 
Peirce Society, and sundry articles. 
However, excepting Gary Shapiro's work on habit which does not 
mention the value of Peirce's concept of habit for education, there 
is no single work to which a modern educator could turn for an 
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explication of habit. There are adequate piecemeal treatments of 
habit. The authors of these >-Jorks have not failed to explain habit; 
but, like Peirce, they sought to explain other things. 
I am indebted to the follm-Jing: Vincent G. Potter, S .J., who 
capably resolved many inconsistencies in Peirce's system and who ad-
mirably interprets Peirce's logical, ethical, and esthetic systems; 
Murray-G. Murphey who traced and delineated Peirce's philosophy and 
was particularly lucid in explaining "cognition," "inquiry," and 
"cosmology;" Francis E. Reilly, S.J. who underscored "habitn as a 
permanent theme in Peirce and explained, so that even a novice like 
myself could understand, Peirce's use of the scientific method; 
Richard J. Bernstein who, in a single extraordinary essay, developed 
a precise delineation of "Firstness," "Secondness," "Thirdness," and 
Peircean self-control; Edward c. Moore and Richard S. Robin who 
edited Studies In Th~ Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, a volume 
without which my thesis would be considerably less. 
My greatest debt, however, is to Gary Shapiro who has given a 
rather important, if,at times, rather recondite, appraisal of the 
general nature of habit, of personality as a cluster of habits, of 
belief and its habitual connection, and of the relationships among 
"rule," "sensation," "case," decisions to act and results. Further-
more, Shapiro charts the interrelationships among logic and habit, 
and physiology and habit. In a reasonable manner Shapiro also de-
lineates the influences in Peirce's philosophical life. 
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CHAPTER II 
PEIRCEAN VOCABULARY 
Language is only the extreme form of expression ••• " wrote 
Charles S. Peirce. He concluded that ''.,.life itself may be con-
sider~d ... as Expression." 
••••••••• 0 0 • 
Peirce's concept of habit can best be explained if some vo-
cabulary "ground clearing" takes place. Charles S. Peirce wrote for 
both the lay and technical readers. Rigorously selecting the right 
word, Peirce often used technical terms and charged them with new 
meaning. When the word which he sought did not exist, he coined it. 
His vocabulary is both common and extraordinary; and his concept of 
habit is affected by his vocabulary. 
It is my main intention to get at, to explicate the meaning 
of Peircean habit and demonstrate its value for education. Others 
have had the intention of explaining the meaning of these key Peircean 
concepts, key, that is, to the nature of habit, 
I have chosen ten terms. These terms are part of the whole 
Peircean system. All of these terms will be included within my third 
chapter. They are terms, if one speaks metaphorically, woven within 
the fabric of habit. They are part of the interlacing threads, in-
troducing details which are connected to the whole called habit. 
7 
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Before I present this basic lexicon for Peircean habit, allow 
me to illustrate briefly why I have selected these terms: Peirce does 
employ "categories" in a traditional sense; yet he places all within 
his categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is es-
sential to be aware of, if not totally understand, Peirce's categories 
before one approaches a thorough study of habit. Furthermore, when 
one views Peircean habit, he views a world of evolution consisting 
in the lessening of "chance," of paradoxical "freedom," and of habit 
related "conduct, law, perception and thinking." The "future," 
the process of "inquiry" and "induction" are defined in a manner 
unique to Peirce; and, like the other terms, they are integral to an 
understanding of habit. 
Lest I appear a dunce in the modern rather than the Renaissance 
sense of the word, I will allow Peircean experts to comment on the 
meaning of: categories, chance, conduct, freedom, the future, inquiry, 
law, induction, perception, and thinking. These concepts will be pre-
sented in lexical fashion: 
The Categories: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness 
My view is that there are modes of being. I hold that we can 
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time 
before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive 
quality, the being of actual fact, and the being of law that 
will govern facts in the future. 
The first category comprises the qualities of phenomena, such 
as red, bitter, tedious, hard, heartening, noble .... 
The second category of elements comprises the actual facts. 
The qualities in so far as they are general ..•. 
The third category of elements of phenomena consists of what 
we call laws when we contemplate them from the outside only. 
(1. 301-2) 1 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are Peirce's irreducible 
categories, his threefold ontological classification which he subse-
quently referred to as It (the \vorld of the senses), Thou (the world 
of the mind), and I (the world of the abstract). These categories, 
derived from Kantian doctrine, are related to habit. In fact Peirce 
places "habit" in the category of Thirdness. Habits, laws, rules, 
potentiality, concepts and meaning are Thirdness. 
Firstness is qualitative and immediate. It is neither subjec-
tive nor objective. It is "unattached possibility" never encountered 
by itself, always encountered in the concrete, in experience from 
which it is inseparable. Richard Bernstein noted that Firstness 
should not be confused with actual experience. It is similar to the 
vague feeling which we, as men, claim to have sensed -- love. Like 
love, it is not subject to analysis.2 
1All citations to Peirce's work will be notated in the tradi-
tional form. The citation numbers refer to: Charles Sanders Peirce, 
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1-6, ed. C. Hart-
shore and P. Weis~ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935) 
and vols. 7-8, ed. A. W. Burks, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1958). 2Richard J. Bernstein, "Action, Conduct, and Self-Control," in 
Perspectives on Peirce: Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. 
Richard J. Bernstein, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 71. 
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Secondness, as Bernstein further demonstrates, is similar to the 
relationship of a shoulder being pushed against a door. The shoulder 
is being made to exert effort. The door resists, This is action, 
not conduct. It is dual and oppugnant, a mutual struggle. 3 It is 
hie et nunc. 
Thirdness like habit (because it includes habit) is future oriented. 
It is like law (cf. "law" entry). It requires Secondness as Secondness 
requires Thirdness. To underscore: if it were not for Secondness, 
there would be no Thirdness. If it were not for brute action, there 
would be no rules, laws, signs, or habits.4 
Peirce's categories frame his entire work. The categories of 
Peirce are too detailed to concern us here. It must, however, be 
remembered that for Peirce the categories represent the three irre-
ducible modes of being: possibility, actuality, and law.5 It must also 
be remembered that Peirce assigns habit to .the category of Thirdness, 
the mode of being concerned with the future. 
Chance: 
I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of 
generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has 
produced all regularities,,. I attribute it altogether to 
chance, it is true, but to chance in the form of spontaneity 
which is to some degree regular. (6,63) 
3Ibid. pp. 71-72. 
4Ibid, PP· 75-76. 5 Cf. 1. 23 
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Within the Peircean Universe, there is the prime element of 
chance or spontaneity. Chance, the mathematical Peircean term for 
spontaneity, becomes an important part of the philosophical system 
of Peirce. "What Peirce is getting at is there is no snch thing as 
purely mechanical movement. All movement requires some degree of 
• 116 spontane1ty .... 
Conduct: 
Although the word "conduct" itself is not of unusual import in 
Peircean literature, it is of value and should be listed in this 
ruuimentary lexicon. Conduct as Bernstein concluded is what Peirce 
calls "would be's."7 It is tied by Peirce to the future and to the 
idea of control. Of equal importance, a "deliberate, or self-controlled 
habit is precisely a belief." (5. 480) 
"Conduct, as distinguished from brute action, is essentially 
general. While brute action is singular, conduct is a type of activ-
ity."8 Peirce, as Vincent Potter summarized, puts forth conduct as 
something which does not come from the innate or intuitive disposition 
of man. Rather Peircean man "makes •.. (an) intention articulate and 
explicit by formulating rules of conduct,"9 Conduct is based on facts 
known. 10 
6vincent G. Potter, S.J., Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals, 
(Amherst: The University of Massachusett~ Press, 1967),~13~ 
?Bernstein, Perspectives, p. 75. 
Brbid. p. 77. 
9 Potter, On Norms, p. 21, 
lOcf. 5.460 
Freedom: 
Vincent Potter waxes both poetic and paradoxical when he writes 
of freedom as he sees it in the writings of Peirce: 
Human purposes are both normative and capable of modification by 
critical review, Human purpose, the archetype of final causes, 
involves habit acquired or modified by reflection on experience. 
It is this capacity for critical review and control of actions 
which defines man as a rational animal and therefore while it 
supposes freedom on man's part, freedom of choice, man is not 
free to accept or reject his nature and its freedom.ll 
A man has no choice but to be rational and thus to become more 
reasonable. 
Future: 
And do not overlook the fact that the pragmaticist maxim says 
nothing of single experiments or of single experimental pheno-
mena (for what is conditionally true in futuro can hardly be 
singular), but only speaks of general~inds of experimental 
phenomena. (5.459) 
lVhether Peirce is writing Latin or English, he is concerned about 
the future. Peirce takes the future more immediately than most, for 
the future as Gary Shapiro states "is real, i.e. it must be recognized 
in the final account of things as independent of the thought of any 
particular person or group."12 
It should be noted that habit is future oriented. 
llPotter, On Norms, p. 127; the reader may also find of interest 
Wells' essay "TheFree Nature of Peirce's Evolutionism," in Studies In 
The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. P. P. Wiener and F. H. 
Young, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). Wells investi-
gates the fundamentally problematic nature of freedom. 
12Gary Michael Shapiro, "Peirce's Theory of Habit" (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Columbia University, 1971), p. 96 
12 
Induction: 
John H. Lenz explicates Peirce's claim that "induction is self 
corrective."l3 Finding Peirce too unclear, he, however, makes no de-
finitive statement. The argument is long but does highlight many 
matters which the true amateur of Peircean induction may want to see 
highlighted. David Savan considers the complexities in Peircean as-
-
sertions about induction in the well argued essay "Peirce's Infalli-
bilism."l4 Arthur W. Burks theorizes about Peircean induction and 
probability in "Peirce's Two Theories of Probability."l5 The nature 
of Peircean induction is perhaps best summarized by Victor Lenzen i.n 
an essay entitled "Charles S. Peirce as Astronomer." 
.•• for all our knowledge is derived from induction, and its 
analogue, hypothesis. Peirce states that the general nature 
of induction is everywhere the same and is completely typified 
by the following example. From a bag of black and white beans 
13 
I take out a handful, and I assume that the black and white are 
nearly in the same ratio throughout the bag. If the experimenter 
is in error in this conclusion, it is an error which a repetition 
of the same process must tend to rectify. It is, therefore, a 
valid inference. But it clearly teaches nothing in reference 
to the color of any particular bean. Only the approximate gen-
eral ratio can be inferred and this is represented by the prob-
ability for black or white beans. Given a large number of bags 
in each of which we know the relative number of black beans, 
then if the black beans have a value and the white beans none, 
the man who knew the relative number of black beans in every bag 
would act as though the bean he would draw from the bag which 
contained the larger proportion of black ones were known to be 
13John W. Lenz, "Induction as Self-Corrective," in Studies In The 
Philosophy~ Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Edward C. Moore and Richard 
S. Robin, (Amherst: The University of Hassachusetts Press, 1964), 
pp. 15l2;162 
David Savan, "Peirce's Infallibilism," in Studies, pp. 190-211. 
15studies, pp. 141-150. 
14 
black, and as though the bean he would draw from the other would 
be certainly white. For knowledge derives its practical im-
portance from its influence upon our conduct.l6 
Inquiry: 
Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of op~n~on ... 
That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a 
very important proposition .... (5.375) 
The above quotations are from the "Fixation of Belief," an 1877 
essay in which Peirce makes valued claims for habit and its relation-
ship to belief. In 1899, Peirce considered the way of inquiry so im-
portant that he suggested, "Do not block the way of inquiry" (1.135) 
should be grafted on every wall of philosophy. In the 1877 article 
which Peirce published in Popular Science Monthly, he noted that one 
of the facts with which logic begins is: "That belief gradually tends 
to fix itself under the influence of inquiry .•.. " (3.670) 
Richard Robin takes the disparate threads entangling inquiry 
and sorts them out: "Since inquiry is defined in terms of the struggle 
caused by the irritation of doubt to attain a state of belief, the 
end of inquiry becomes the fixation of belief ... truth is that at 
hi h . . • nl7 w c 1nqu1ry a1ms .... 
Peirce, trusting in science, equates rational inquiry with scien-
tific inquiry. Truth, for Peirce, is belief compelled by scientific 
inquiry. 
16studies, pp. 41-42. 
17Richard Robin, "Peirce's Doctrine of the Normative Sciences," 
in Studies, pp. 273-274. 
Law 
Peirce uses law in a less rigid sense than most scientists 
would. Law should not be confused with "law-statement." For Peirce, 
the law of reason is the basis for regularities or habits. It is 
subject to both modification and growth. It demands not exact con-
formity; it does not freeze further modifications of habit. "The 
law of mind makes a given feeling more likely to rise." (6.23) 
Law, for Peirce, involves spontaneity or chance; it involves the 
future and, of course, habit. Law for Peirce is a generalizing 
tendency; it is the cause of action and "self generative." 
Rollin Workman, in an essay entitled "Pragmatism and Realism" 
makes a clear distinction between two senses of the word "law." 
••. A Law is in the first place a real active thing (5.107, 
1.542). It is active in the way habit is active. In fact a 
habit is simply a law as the latter appears in human beings 
(2.148). In the second sense, a law is a verbal statement 
of a law in the first meaning. The description of a habit is 
also a law in sense two.l8 
Perception: 
Richard J. Bernstein warns in "Peirce's Theory of Perception." 
"When approaching Peirce, one cannot help feeling a bit apprehensive 
about presenting a coherent account of his views on perception ... "19 
Bernstein, at length, considers perception in terms of Peirce's philo-
sophie dialectic and concludes: 
18Rollin Workman, "Pragmatism and Realism," Studies, p. 244. 
l9studies, p. 165. 
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Perception, for Peirce, is the means by which we come into con-
tact with a richly textured qualitative world which is far more 
extensive than the narrow boundaries set by both empiricists 
and rationalists as well as by contemporary analysts. Through 
perception we are aware of a world which forces itself upon us. 
Perception is both the starting point and testing ground for 
our most imaginative speculations. Perception as judgment is 
logically continuous with the self-controlled judgments that 
are characteristic of the higher reaches of rationality. Per-
ception, nevertheless, stands at the threshold of all inquiry 
controllable and eminently fallible. Perception conditions all 
thought and is the basis for the rational control of action. 
~The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at 
the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of pur-
posive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both 
those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. 20 
Thinking: 
Vincent Potter notes as J. Boler did in Charles Peirce and 
Scholastic Realism: 
Of course pragmaticism recognizes a connection between thought 
and action. Ultimately it makes thought apply to action, and 
indeed it is thought which distinguishes conduct from mere 
activity. Yet this is quite different from saying either that 
thought consists in action or that thought's ultimate Eurpose 
· is action.21 
Potter concludes the above summary with Peirce's words: 
16 
••• As for the ultimate purpose of thought, which must be the 
purpose of everything, it is beyond human comprehension; but 
according to the stage or approach my thought has made of it ... 
it is by the indefinite replication of self-control upon self-
control that the vir is begotten, and by action, through thought, 
he grows an esthetic ideal .•. as the share which God permits him 
to have in the work of creation. (5.403) 
20
rbid. p. 184; cf. also 5.22. 
21Potter, On Norms, p. 66. 
The "ground clearing" is accomplished. The terms, necessary to 
an understanding of habit, have been examined. Their importance •..rill 
become evident in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
HABIT 
Habit, for Charles Sanders Peirce, is basic, Peirce considered 
and reconsidered the ontological status of habit. To understand how 
Peirce could make habit of such fundamental importance, one must view 
habit in its various stages within Peircean literature: from habit 
associated with habitualiter to habit specified as belief. 
Peirce clarified, by degrees, the difference between habitual 
presence and habit as belief. What is of particular importance in a 
consideration of the educational value of Peircean habit is that all 
beliefs, for Peirce, are habits and all habits, however, are not 
beliefs. In fact, it is within the consideration of "belief-habit" 
that.Peirce becomes the most lucid, the most coherent. "Belief-habit" 
is the keystone supporting the more encompassing notion of habit. 
Peirce's development of "belief-habit" is not linear, thus it must 
be examined at various times in a variety of contexts. 
These examinations are essential to an understanding of "belief-
habit." I will examine habit and capability, habit and the tendency 
to take habits, and habit as distinguished from the habitual. I will 
also note the logical context into which Peirce placed habit. I shall 
then examine, via illustration, Peircean man believing, controlling, 
and doubting. I shall further examine two important corollaries which 
18 
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Peirce drew from his consideration of "belief-habit." From Peirce's 
definitions of belief and habit, will emerge man, a cluster of habits. 
HABIT AND CAPABILITY 
In the mode of Duns Scotus, Peirce postulated that a notion could 
exist in the mind habitualiter, i.e. when it can but does not neces-
sarily produce a conception.! Peirce is considering a type of abstract 
knowledge, which although capable, is not realized in consciousness, 
i.e. does not reach intellectual fruition. This type of abstract 
knowledge is present in some sense. For example: John, a high school 
student, may know various rules governing the use of the gerund, its 
relationship to a noun, and its verbal limitations. Yet, John may 
never call to mind this knowledge when he writes "Biking is good exer-
cise." This type of knowledge is an example of the habitualiter notion. 
For to know the function and the use of the gerund admits to John a 
capability. It is a capability which John can but does not use; it is 
a capability which does not produce. Peirce is noting, through the 
use of the word habitualiter, capability and its relation to habit. 
Eventually, Peirce will argue that ~ person can have a belief as one 
can have a concept which will not necessarily, at once, be put to use. 
It could be used if the occasion arises. The capability is there. 
!Murray G. Murphey, The Development of Peirce's Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 177. 
The notion of capability will be developed in the consideration of 
belief-habit. 
20 
Thus Peirce, the pragmatic philosopher, in the 1860's, is con-
sidering habit in terms of capability; simultaneously the mathematical 
Peirce is considering that, within infinity, certain characters start 
appearing with greater frequency than others, i.e. (to use a Peircean 
phrase) there is "a tendency to take habits." 2 
HABIT AND THE TENDENCY TO TAKE HABITS 
"To take" is not as innocent as it appears. It is worthy of con-
sideration. The idea of "taking" connotes garbing, clothing, and, 
often, changing of outward appearance. Peirce begins his argument on 
habit in medias res. For the word "habit" and the idea of "taking" 
gives the student the impression of arming one's self for the occasion. 
Peirce connects the two: "habit" and "taking;" but he does not explain 
the .tone, the ideas which he associates with "habit." He uses "habit" 
on account of what he associates with the word; it is not immediately 
clear for the student of Peirce what these associations are. It is 
only in Peirce's later works when we begin to understand the linking 
of "habit," "taking," and belief that we begin to understand what 
Peirce associates with habit. 
HABIT AND ITS LOGICAL CONTEXT 
Within the Peircean consideration of habit and the habitual, a 
further clarification developed. In "Some Consequences of Four In-
capacities," Peirce underscored the formation of habit as an induction: 
2cf. 6.21 and 6.22 
21 
Attention produces effects upon the nervous system. These effects 
are habits ... A habit arises when, having had the sensation of 
performing a certain act, m, on several occasions a, b, c, we 
come to do it upon every occurence of the general ~ve;t,-~, of 
which~· ~. ~ are special cases. 
Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore 
necessarily connected with attention and abstraction. Voluntary 
actions result from the sensations produced by habit, as in-
structive actions result from our original nature. (5.297) 
Thus a habit results from a case or stimulus or occasion present-
iqg itself. A result has occurred. A rule is followed, more precisely 
"a belief of a rule." For Peirce, every belief is a rule.3 Every 
belief is a rule in the sense that a person is disposed to act, prepared 
to act if the occasion arises. In fact, the person is prepared even if 
the occasion does not arise. 
The always logical Peirce uses induction as his logical formula 
to express the forming of a habit. If one links induction to the 
earlier idea of capability, one can see that habit is more than an 
innate disposition. It is an induction tied to a "general event." 
When a habit is operative, a result may come about. That is, when 
certain events occur, Peirce argues a habit may become operative. 
Conditions present themselves. Man notes the particular facts and is 
attentive since he has seen similar conditions. He then separates 
the thought from the circumstance. He may have noted the conditions 
repeatedly before. His attention and abstraction are voluntary for he 
is dealing with signs of which he is and has been aware. He then 
3 Cf. 2.643. 
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draws a conclusion based upon the past (previous manifestations of 
these conditions). Then he may act. The action which results from 
this Peircean "welding of sensation" is also voluntary; it is action 
which results from perception. This type of action should not be 
confused with action which is instinctive, i.e. action resulting from 
man's original nature. 4 
PEIRCEAN MAN 
Peirce saw man's innate or natural disposition, by degrees, 
becoming a structure informed or given character and, still gradually, 
becoming more developed, less chaotic because man's disposition acquired, 
via experience and perception, habits.s Peirce (like Wordsworth: "the 
eye it cannot choose but see") considered perception6 to lack control. 
How can man control then what he perceives? Peircean man, we shall see, 
controls by way of habit and its inferential nature. 
One illustration may serve to make perception and inferential 
activity and their connection to habit clear: Mr. Santiago is driving 
down an unknown street. Seeing a "stop sign," he stops because his 
attention was drawn to an essentially "general event," not a particular 
sign. He stopped not on account of intuition but because he had the 
habit of stopping at stop signs, because he had abstracted "stop" from 
the red octagon, and because he applied the rule "stop at stop signs" 
to this particular attention-drawing sign. He stopped here and now. 
4c£. 6. 228. 
Scf. 5.504; 5.5115; 1.647. 
6cf. Chapter two: "Perception" 
The act of stopping is an individual act; but it is related to Mr. 
Santiago's past experience. The action is a further securing of the 
"habit" for the future. Mr. Santiago believes in this habit. Since 
he believes, he knows that by taking his foot off the gas and braking 
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he can achieve the desired result. Believing guides or molds his action. 
Mr. Santiago is satisfied for, as Peirce would append, Mr. Santiago is 
certai_11. 
What would happen if a sign said "stop" but it did not resemble 
the usual red octagon? Should Mr. Santiago stop? The "if" information 
is different; Mr. Santiago cannot follow his usual sequence. It is not 
that Santiago disbelieves; no, rather he is in a state of uncertainty 
about the future. His habit, which is future oriented, has faltered. 
He must reshape his habit. He must now exercise control for there is 
a problem in his guiding principle. 
Control, for Peirce, is the power to reason, the power to place 
ideals or purposes under a microscope of critical review.7 The object 
of reasoning is to find out what we do not know. In order to find out 
what we do not know, we must begin with knowledge already acquired 
which we believe to be true and valid, knowledge which can inferentially 
guide us. 
7cf. Chapter two: "Conduct" 
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That \vhich determines us, from given premises, to draw one infer-
ence rather than another, is some habit of mind, whether it be 
constitutional or acquired. The habit is good ... according as it 
produces true conclusions ..• and an inference is valid ••• according 
as the habit which determines it is such to produce true con-
clusions. The particular habit of mind which governs this or 
that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth 
depends on the validity of the inference which the habit deter-
mines; and such a formula is called the guiding principle of in-
ference.B 
With perception and control delineated, habit and belief can be 
-
outlined. Peirce, interestingly, approached belief both positively 
and negatively. Negatively, he considered "doubt," the foil of belief. 
Returning to the previous example may help to illustrate both belief 
and doubt. 
Mr. Santiago had a belief, a habit of which he was conscious.9 
If he actually called this belief to mind and it, in a logical sense, 
held true, this would be a good judgment. 
What our hypothetical Mr. Santiago did, when he came to the non-
red octagon stop sign, was compare pertinent past experiences to the 
present stimulus, i.e. the non-red sign. He then reconsidered. His 
activity was erratic. His reconsidering, however, may lead to the form-
ing of a new resolve which will become a new habit. The erratic ac-
tivity and old habit will be superseded by a new habit.lO Perhaps, 
he will stop at all signs lettered "stop." The individual stimulus, 
8rn 5.367 and 2.711 Peirce uses habit to refer to both acquired 
and congenital habits; but, as Vincent Potter points out (On Norms, p. 
126) Peirce (Cf. 5.531) is really speaking of acquired habits. 
9cf. 4.53 
lOcf. 5.417 
the non-red stop sign has become part of the cluster of thoughts. 
This new resolve is consequent to previous resolves as one thought 
is consequent to a previous thought. This new resolve is a belief 
habit. A belief is always a habit; and thus belief should be re-
ferred to as "belief-habit."11 
Belief-habit is a dialogue among the past, the present, and the 
future. 12 A belief may be completed only for a moment. The dialogue 
may, as in the case of Mr. Santiago, be interrupted by doubt: 
A true doubt of such a belief must interfere with this natural 
mode of acting •.• these new habits must not be regarded as ex-
pressions of the natural belief simply; for they inevitably 
involve something more. Consequently, if subsequent reflection 
results in doubt of them, it is not necessarily doubt of the 
original belief, although it may be mistaken for such a 
doubt. (5.76) 
Whether it is a doubt of the original belief or not, doubt 
creates an uneasy dissatisfaction; it thus causes a different sen-
sation than believing causes. Doubting does not guide man or mold 
action. Rather, man is forced, because he doubts, to free himself 
from this annoying feeling of dissatisfaction; man is forced, because 
he doubts, to seek satisfaction and calm; man is forced to believe. 
Doubt is appeased; habit is established. 
Simply stated: doubt will stimulate man to struggle for 
belief; and belief places man in a condition from which he is 
llcf. Chapter two: 
12cf. Chapter two: 
Thinking 
Future 
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capable of reacting in a certain way if the occasion arises. Thus 
the occasion to struggle to attain belief is doubt. The motive for 
belief is the removal of doubt. Satisfaction comes to the believer; 
for his belief settles the immediate doubt, establishes a temporary 
terminus for opinion, ends inquiry, and enables the dialogue among 
the past, present, and future to continue. 
-Mr. Santiago's "belief-habit" was obstructed, he doubted. The 
conditions being different from those which he usually perceived 
destroyed his certainty. His habit gave way to uncertainty. In a 
more serious case, uncertainty often gives birth to apprehension, 
qualms, and anxiety. Man (Mr. Santiago is typical of the species), 
thus, is motivated to seek a new habit which will not be blocked, 
a belief with "practical consequences" which are expected to al-
leviate disappointment. 
It is Peirce's view that every problem (struggle to believe/ 
inquiry) 13 is stimulated by doubt and ended with a new belief--a 
conscious, deliberate habit of action. 
Peirce draws two corollaries from his consideration of "habit 
of action": (1) Belief is a rule of action.14 (2) Two apparently 
different beliefs, having the same practical consequences, have the 
same meaning. Within this second proposition lies the Pragmatic 
criterion of meaning. In Peircean terms, it is related thus: 
13cf. Chapter two: "Inquiry" 
14I would like to direct the reader's attention to Baldwin's 
Dictionary of Philosophy. T~vo articles, one on "Rule" and one on 
"Laws of Thought", are initialed "C.S.P." I would further suggest 
that the use of "rule" suggests an approved procedure, approved 
that is by the actor. 
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In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception, 
one should consider what practical consequences might conceiv-
ably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and 
the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning 
of the conception. (5.9) 
Belief, falling under the category of Thirdness,l5 is a rule of 
action. Action, stemming from thought,l6 involves consequences; in 
fact, a belief-habit is the very purpose which Peirce attributes to 
thought. In Peircean terms, when a person states that he understands 
-· 
the meaning of a thing, he really is saying that he understands not 
the thought behind an action but rather the very action brought about. 
This action is the result of action; more specifically, it is the 
result of the sum of the belief-habits involved. 
It must be noted that action is the result of the habits involved 
and the correct circumstances. In Peircean terms, a habit is on a 
continuum with other habits. An individual habit can only be iden-
tified by "how" it might lead someone to act "when" certain circum-
stances prevail. The identity of a habit depends on both the stimulus 
received by way of perception and the eventuating sensible results. 17 
The second corollary involves the meaning of a habit; that mean-
ing is associated with actual results. 
l5cf. Chapter two: "Categories" 
16cf. 6.20 and Chapter two: "Thinking" 
17cL s.4oo 
It should be noted that two people may have the same habit; and 
this fact (that they have the same habit) can be judged by an obser-
vation of the practical consequences. 
Allow me to illustrate with a non-belief habit: two boys are 
shooting baskets from different points in a court. Gravitation is 
different. Age is different. Size is different. Both boys make all 
their shgts. The same practical consequences occur. Their clusters 
of training, adroitness, and experience produce results with the same 
meaning. 
So too, what the result of a habit will be depends partly on 
what other habits the subject has and partly on the ability of one 
habit to modify another. To illustrate this Peirce uses the effect 
of gravitation on two different subjects. Gravitation is a non-
belief habit that has a different result when it is applied to a 
billiard ball being dropped from a high building than when it is 
applied to a parachutist jumping from a plane. Both the billiard 
ball and the parachutist are clusters of non-belief habits. The 
results are different. 
Consider man to be a cluster of habits. The cluster for each 
man is different. Another habit is added to the cluster. This habit, 
like all habits, is similar to a line drawn on a blackboard. The 
line gets its continuity, its coherence, its detailing from the black-
board itself as the habit gets its immediate connection to a subject 
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and its meaning because a structure already exists, a structure of 
other habits which have similar but not equal staying power.l8 
Peirce has defined "belief-habit" slowly. It is a definition 
which becomes clear by degrees. Capability, habit-taking, and in-
duction are associated with habit, but habit becomes most lucid when 
specified as a belief. 
To sum up thus far: Peircean man thinks in order to establish 
a ~elief, a rule of action, a habit of the mind. A belief-habit is 
something of which man is conscious. A belief-habit contents doubt; 
thought rests. This belief-habit influences other thinking. If one 
applies this belief, further doubt may come about. Further thinking 
follows further doubt. Peircean man will continue to reflect upon 
an ideal. Intending to act, he will continue to formulate rules 
of conduct. Holding a concept, his mind constantly encounters 
· matteF and evolves. His thought grows when he forms new habits, 
discards old habits, or allows one habit to influence another. 
Peircean man becomes more uniform; he is less deformed by spontaneity 
when he continues to establish rules of conduct, habits of thought. 
Habits are general; action, however, is singular. The habit 
effects a certain disposition which is affected by other habits; 
the habit, with other habits, becomes part of the pragmatic man's 
"muscles." The desired ideal, by way of reflection, becomes a 
18 
Cf. 6. 228 
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potentiality and thus a calculus for prediction. The "would be" 
becomes a foundation for the "will be." The ideal becomes a habit, 
a law of conduct.l9 
Habit, developed, modified, and corrected, by both experience 
and reflection is simply a law. It is not a law of exact conformity.20 
It is a conditional law having requirements or stipulations. Given 
these eonditions the action may follow. Physical laws demand a 
response in exact accordance. Exact compliance, Peirce would argue, 
negates man's freedom. Man, in a Peircean paradox, is not free to 
reject his freedom, not free to be irrational.21Man, using his 
reasons, is not free to be irrational. With reason the Peircean man 
is not only sapient but liberated. Man, compelled to make life more 
reasonable, of necessity will review critically all habits acquired 
and modified. Not governed by absolute belief-habit, man may, 
through force of habit, hold fast to a rule of conduct proven to be 
an impediment to truth. Nevertheless, (thank Zeus for Peircean op-
timism!) this same man will through force of reason give up the 
habit. Peircean man can modify a habit by experience or by will . 
..• every man exercises more or less control over himself by 
means of modifying his own habits; and the way in which he 
goes to work to bring this effect about in those cases in 
which circumstances will not permit him to practice reitera-
tions of the desired kind of conduct in the outer world •.. 
19cf. Chapter two: "Law" 
20cf. 6. 23 
2lcf. Chapter two: "Freedom" 
fancied reiterations, if well intensified by direct effort, 
produce habits; and these habits will have power!£ influence 
actual behavior in the outer world ... (5.487) 
Habits will have the power, the capability, to influence be-
havior in the world outside the mind. Peircean man can woolgather 
about a certain situation: he can prepare to save the life of his 
burning sister, to accept an award for heroism beyond the call of 
duty, to talk back to his boss, or to reprimand a naughty child. 
The situations may arise again and again in his mind. Each time 
he practices, in the world of the imagination, the action for the 
situation. 
Peircean man is a citizen of a "double world;" the outer 
world and the world of fancy or the imagination. The degree to 
which a man can be affected by the world of fancy depends on his 
innate disposition and his other habits. 
Of notable importance is that the man, who chooses to exercise 
control, can work to bring about in his mind a habit which circum-
stances in the outer world do not allow. This habit can influence 
other habits; but this habit comes under the Peircean law of habit. 
Uniformities in the modes of action of things have come about 
by their taking habits. At present, the course of events is 
approximately determined by law. In the past that approxi-
mation was less perfect; in the future it will become more 
and more perfect. The tendency to obey laws has always 
been and will be growing. (1.409) 
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Peirce, ever the mathematician, viewed the world as consisting 
in uniformities, potentialities, regularities, and habits: These 
habits, subject to modification, may establish ne\v better habits or 
potentialiti~s. Belief-habits, also subject to modification, may 
also establish better belief-habits bridging "the chasm between the 
chance medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law." (6.262) 
{)ne can infer the actual behavior of men from their "poten-
tialities." There is, however, a necessary admonition: this in-
ference can be made with degrees of, not complete, certainty for 
Peirce is concerned with probability and the long run. To say that 
a man has a habit is to state that he will "probably" react in one 
way because he has already reacted in this way. Action always con-
tains "a certain amount of spontaneity;" and habits are "gentle 
forces" making a certain action more likely. 
The essence of the Peircean man is his behavior, his observed 
habits. Behavior is the sum of the habits involved. We know what 
a man is by viewing what he does. Definitions, for Peirce, are 
vital, alive with action. They consist in descriptions of what 
habits are calculated to produce. "Ye shall know them by their 
fruits." 
In Peirce's cosmos, the tendency to form habits grows through 
itself. The degree of conformity of habit to law increases with 
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the exercise of habit. Peirce's universe is one of chaotic chance 
tending to order. His man is a child of chance evolving to uniformity. 
To conclude: belief-habit is an intelligently acquired habit. 
Habit is prime for the Peircean man. Habit is a law or conditional 
relating antecedent conditions to consequent experience. Habit 
allows man to criticize his activity and the activity of others. 
Habit is the essence of belief. Different beliefs will establish 
different modes of action. Habit is at the very core of man's 
aqility to control his activity. To Peirce, control and the ten-
dency to take habits are synonyomous. To reason is to demonstrate 
the capacity for control. Reasoning begins with a truth, or rather 
the recognition of something as true22 and proceeds to a new truth. 
Reasoning, deliberate and controlled, supposes freedom and yet forces 
man, who sees the more reasonable course, to acquire various habits. 
The establishment of habit is the essence of belief.23 Beliefs are 
distinguished pragmatically by the actions to which they give rise, 
by their sensible effects. 
maxim: 
It is Peirce's deliberation on habit which led to his pragmatic 
22cf. 4.476 
23
cf. 5. 39 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our con-
ception of the object. (5.402) 
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It is also habit which is at the nucleus of the Peircean theory 
of the universe. 
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of ob-
jective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits 
becoming physical laws. (6.25) 
·-. 
·.· 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In my concluding chapter, I do not intend to argue the right-
ness of Peirce's evaluation of habit. I do not intend to base a 
curriculum or even a syllabus upon Peircean habit. Rather, I 
intend to suggest that Charles Sanders Peirce's work is worthy of 
consideration in the educational field and that "habit" is a good 
focal point at which educators could begin that consideration. 
As I noted in Chapter One, Peirce left a wealth of coded 
brilliance; but his work was hardly systematic. Since Peirce did 
not present a clear system, many students of Peirce have imposed 
an order upon his works. Unfortunately, the ordering of Peirce's 
works is often arbitrary. In fact, the works are often treated in 
a Procrustean manner. Head and legs, if one will excuse the 
gory metaphor, are stretched or chopped to make Peirce's work fit 
theory. Peirce, however, lies uncomfortably in another's theory. 
In the field of education, two dissertations, Elvira Tarr's 
"The Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce and Its Relation To 
Education" and George S. Macc:;ia's "The Epistemology of Charles S. 
Peirce and Its Implications For A Philosophy of Education" demon-
strate the educational value of Peirce's works, provide seminal 
material for further discussion and debate, and underscore the 
difficulty of ordering Peirce's works. I will limit my remarks on 
the dissertations to brief summaries and comments pertinent to 
habit. Having discussed the t>-JO dissertations, I will then provide 
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an illustration of an educator considering a student's problem in 
terms of Peircean habit. 
I 
George Maccia's dissertation is worthy of praise. Without 
his audacious attempt Ms. Tarr's work and my own would probably 
have met with less success. In 1952, Maccia attempted to systematize 
educationally The Collected Papers and to compare their content to 
John Dewey's Democracy and Education. In Maccia's own words, the 
purpose of this study was to answer the following questions: 
What is the relation between the knower and the known? 
What is the relation between knowing and truth? 
What is the relation between knowing and the good? 
What are the aims of education as derived from Peirce's 
epistemology? 
What are the aims of education as stated by John Dewey in 
Democracy and Education? 
How do these aims of education as derived from Peirce compare 
with those stated by Dewey? 
Who should control the curriculum? 
What should be the organization of the curriculum?! 
Directing his dissertation towards both students of philosophy 
and students of education, Maccia failed to serve Peirce well. 
Attempting too much, Maccia was also asking rhetorically whether 
the attacks against modern education would be valid and effective 
if they were leveled against Peirce's philosophy of pragmaticism. 
In the world of the hypothetical, Maccia's questions were meritoriously 
profitable. As I noted, however, the scope was too large; and the 
1George S. Maccia, "The Epistemology of Charles S. Peirce And 
Its Implications For A Philosophy of Education" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Southern California, 1952), p.4. 
limitations were arbitrary and without needed defense. For example 
it is difficult to understand the validity of the following premise: 
The study of the aims of education of John Dewey will be 
limited to those found in his book entitled Democracy 
and Education. This writing of Dewey is widely used as a 
text in colleges of education and departments of education 
in universities throughout the country. Therefore, it is 
assumed that aims of education expressed in this volume 
would be reflected in educational teaching and practice 
which follow the teachings of John Dewey.2 
Can John Dewey justly be limited to Democracy and Education 
and then compared to the whole published opus of Peirce? 
Nonetheless, my main criticism of Maccia concerns habit. More 
specifically, Maccia depended on Peirce for consistency. At one 
point, Peirce may have insisted that one can develop habits only 
through experience; but, at another time, Peirce may state that 
important habits can be developed in the imagination. Imagination 
for Peirce plays a larger role than Maccia realized when he stated 
"Since the student can only learn through experience, he must 
experience conduct which is commensurate with the ethical aim."3 
The vagaries of the imagination do not necessarily have to be tested 
in experience as Maccia suggested. The world of imagination can 
be conducive to habit formation and learning. 
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Additionally, since Peirce often uses a word in both a technical 
sense and common sense, it seems of value for Maccia to have mentioned 
2Ibid. p. 16. 
3rbid. p. 177. 
38 
this. Ill defined, habit in Maccia's thesis omitted important deno-
tations. Without a stipulative definition or an illustrative example, 
much became argued that was beyond the consideration of Peirce: 
Habit and belief are closely allied; therefore, the distinction 
between the two must be clarified. A habit is a tendency to 
behave in a similar way under similar future circumstances. 
Habit is not an affection of consciousness. It is a general 
law of action. As a law, habit is a rule that determines 
that on a certain general kind of occasion man will act in a 
~ertain general kind of way. Belief is a habit.4 
Not only does the above quotation fail to clarify habit or 
belief but it also leaves the reader in need of what both Maccia 
and I felt was an important distinction. Habit and belief are of 
more than passing importance, and Maccia's failure to clarify impeded 
my appreciation of his work. 
Maccia has attempted too much: an encomium on Peircean aims, 
a derived Peircean epistemology, a comparison of Dewey to Peirce, 
and a proposed Peircean curricular solution to modern educational 
problems. 
II 
Unfortunately, Elvira Tarr's work views Peirce through a glass 
even more darkly than Maccia's work. Tarr's The Epistemology of Charles 
Sanders Peirce and Its Relation to Education provides an introduction, 
based on The Collected Papers, to Peirce's epistemology, his social 
philosophy, and their relation to education. Tarr's work is im-
pressive but not totally satisfying. 
4Ibid. p. 65. 
If one reads the rather brief"summary" sections that serve as 
hardly more than textual glosses providing a running commentary, 
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one understands Ms. Tarr's problem. Transitions from one idea to 
another were accomplished with great difficulty,for all of Peirce's 
work comprised his epistemology. The dissertation ranged too widely. 
It should have. For to analyze The Collected Papers would demand 
volumes of massive length and herculean effort. 
Tarr's work, however, was impressive. It did identify and 
describe the Peircean limits of knowledge, the origin of philosophic 
doubt, the tradition in which he worked, his philosophic predecessors, 
and Peirce's importance to philosophy. 
I found of particular interest Ms. Tarr's discussion of both 
conduct and experience. Her comments on both the teaching and 
learning of philosophy were significant and well worth re-examination • 
• Ms. Tarr's main concern, however, was with formulating the 
epistemology of Peirce from his published papers and with developing 
proposals for education based on these principles. 
Without attempting to make Peirce's work coherent, Tarr examined 
what she considered major areas: Peirce's criticism of Kant and 
Descartes, his ontology, his concept of perception, his categories, 
his phenomenology, and his ideas concerning community, conformity, 
evolution, and control. Finally, Ms. Tarr suggested a curriculum based 
on her analysis of Peirce's work. Tarr's Peircean curriculum, above 
all, stressed inquiry and omitted the importance of habit. 
Ms. Tarr dismissed "habit" early in her study: 
Peirce uses the word 'instinct' in a rather broad sense. 
He builds on the idea of habit, which is a disposition, 
that is, a "general principle working in a man's nature 
to determine how he will act"; he further views an instinct 
as an inherited disposition. Because it is so difficult to 
be certain whether a habit is inherited or due to infantile 
training, Peirce uses the word 'instinct' to cover both 
cases (2.170). 5 
Having dismissed habit because Peirce at one time favored 
instinct, Tarr failed to note the countless occasions that habit 
was precisely the word Peirce chose. Yet a mere three paragraphs 
later Ms. Tarr herself, quoting and paraphrasing Peirce, used 
"habit" but failed to examine or to define it. In fact, habit 
is linked neither to belief nor to inquiry in Ms. Tarr's analysis. 
The use of habit is not a casual use; nor does every use of 
habit fall neatly under the cover of instinct. Habit is too easily 
dismissed. Its dismissal, I believe, leaves a noticeable lacuna 
in Tarr's evaluation of Peirce's epistemology. 
Tarr unfortunately also uses inquiry, the .struggle for belief, 
in both technical and common senses. This misuse often confuses 
the reader and, in fact, quite frankly perplexed me,for Ms. Tarr 
must have realized that there is a marked difference between a 
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word which indicates a struggle to believe and a word which indicates 
a seeking of information by questioning. 
5Elvira Tarr, "The Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce And 
Its Relation to Education" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 
1968); p. 95. 
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Ms. Tarr, however, did make an important contribution to Peircean 
literature. Hers is a study of wide spectrum; yet it is in the width 
of the study that the serious fault lies. One hundred and seventy 
pages simply cannot supply a complete epistemology for Charles S. 
Peirce. More to the point, habit, although mentioned, is never 
considered as a major philosophical concept in Tarr's chapters on 
epistemology, social philosophy, or education. 
In both Tarr's and Maccia's works, width and seeming compre-
hensiveness circumscribe Peirce; his work is treated in such a 
cursory manner that often the examination seemed desultory and 
rambling. A more protracted, exhaustive approach would have achieved 
Ms. Tarr's desire to "stimulate educational practices and research." 
III 
Yet, as I believe is now obvious, habit is a term worth 
ling~ring over and contemplating. It is one term with which a 
gradual approach to Peirce could begin. 
An awareness of Peircean habit could cause an educator to 
reconsider, to evaluate, to amend, to rectify, or to leave alone 
educational goals. Habit is a concept to which a reasoning edu-
cator should respond. It, I believe, is a concept capable of pro-
voking excitement and stirring the imagination. Peircean habit 
takes us far beyond "a settled disposition or tendency (esp. on 
the part of the individual) leading one to do easily, naturally, 
and with growing skill or certainty what one does often."6 It 
6webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language: 
Second Edition Unabridged. 
takes us beyond habit's synonyms carrying their own implications 
and information. Allow me to illustrate: 
Solomon Broderick, having been raised on the West Side of 
Chicago, attended a Chicago Public High School for three years. 
Desiring to go to college but aware that his difficulties with 
written English would prove a stumbling block, Solomon sought the 
advice of his Senior English teacher. 
Solomon's teacher, Mr. Armon, had encountered students like 
Solomon before -- students who were from "another country," 
students who had not learned to get by, and students whose errors 
in writing were not even predictable. 
Armon felt that only a miracle, equivalent to the raising of 
Lazarus, would help Solomon in writing. Armon's expertise in 
belletristic literature was not what Solomon needed. Armon mused: 
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"Solomon is not ineducable; he writes as he spoke; drab, colloquial 
jargon. Solomon writes that way because that type of writing always 
worked." 
Upon closer analysis, Armon noted that Solomon's habitually 
bad writing was the product of many influences. Solomon, like 
his friends, found pleasure in community argot. He often imitated 
the clipt, elliptical speech of his TV or movie heroes. Speaking 
in class was a humiliating experience. Writing for school put 
Solomon in a state of confusion; avoidance of the task became 
commonplace. Hours were spent putting off the assignment; excuses 
were made. The only thing Solomon was sureofwas that the task 
was impossible. The more he had to write, the more strained he 
felt, the more he became aware of the fact that he could no longer 
communicate on paper what he really thought. Perhaps, Armon con-
cluded, Solomon never could and never did communicate what he in-
tended. 
Let us now view Broderick through a Peircean scope. 
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Broderick is, on the positive side, less chaotic in his writing 
than he was in his early grammar school years. Believing that his 
writing was adequate for the goal of getting by, Broderick molded 
his action in accordance. He continued to write as he had been 
writing. 
The future goal, however, for Broderick is different. Solomon 
Broderick feels that his writing will no longer be acceptable, i.e. 
the babit of writing which worked in the past to a minimum degree 
is failing him in the present and will fail him in the future. 
To correct this habit, control must be exercised. Solomon Broderick 
must reshape his habit of writing. 
The habit of writing is made up of many components: punctua-
tion, grammar, mechanics, spelling usage, style, and documentation. 
Some of those components are valid for Solomon. Solomon, for 
example, may have a basic sentence sense. This basic sentence 
sense could be the basis for writing effective prose. Perhaps, 
Armon could show Broderick how he weights his prose down with cliches, 
vague language, misplaced modifiers. Broderick could be taught to 
view his own work from the reader's perspective, taught to see that 
words, phrases and punctuation are significant to people other than 
teachers. 
But first Broderick should understand the nature of his 
doubt -- that he no longer believes that the idiosyncracies of 
street_ vernacular, omissions and illogic work. 
Can Peirce help? Does Peirce's concept of habit allow the 
previous use? The question is sincere. The answer is positive 
but qualified. 
Peirce would say that a new habit could be developed, that 
the student should begin with what he has; he would further stress 
the dialogue among the past, present, and future. Of course, he 
would note that this new habit would, if developed, become part 
of a cluster of other habits. All of these habits, Peirce would 
add, modify one another. 
In this theoretical example, the word "habit" would take on 
implications far beyond the dictionary's definition and possibly 
beyond the contextual meaning of any text on writing. It could 
lead to a new way of looking at the world as it did with Peirce. 
Habit, which Peirce viewed as giving order to the universe, 
ironically gives an ordered approach to Peirce's work. Peirce's 
work has been acknowledged by others as deserving investigation 
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for its educational value. My contribution has been to bring a 
single concept, habit, into sharp focus, a point of concentration 
from which educators may begin to study, to understand, or to 
argue with Peirce. I have removed all that was unnecessary to 
"habit" in order to strengthen my presentation; I have, however, 
been faithful to Peirce's work, a work which elucidates doubt, 
~nquiry, and belief and a work which views man as a cluster of 
habits. 
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